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The philosophical significance of attitudinal autonomy—viz., the autonomy of attitudes such
as beliefs—is widely discussed in the literature on moral responsibility and free will. Within
this literature, a key debate centres around the following question: is the kind of attitudinal
autonomy that’s relevant to moral responsibility at a given time determined entirely by a sub-
ject’s present mental structure at that time? Internalists say ‘yes’, externalists say ’no’. In this
essay, I motivate a kind of distinctly epistemic attitudinal autonomy, attitudinal autonomy that
is relevant to knowledge. I argue that regardless of whether we are externalists or internalists
about the kind of attitudinal autonomy that is relevant for moral responsibility, we should be
externalists about the kind of autonomy that a belief must have to qualify as knowledge.
1. Suppose Prometheus is tied to a ship, bound by ropes so that he can’t move
an inch. Prometheus is considerably less autonomous than he would be were his
ropes cut. But even in this predicament—where he is completely unable to phys-
ically act or affect his environment—there remains a sense in which Prometheus
is autonomous in a way he would not be were he not only physically bound but
also drugged and hypnotised.
This difference is a useful reference point for distinguishing between two
broad types of personal autonomy: outward-directed autonomy—which is what
Prometheus lacks in virtue of being tied up—and inward-directed autonomy, which
is what he retains even when shackled (but not when drugged or hypnotised).1
The species of personal autonomy that this chapter will have as its focus is
exclusively inward-directed personal autonomy—viz., autonomy of the mind. But
the focus will be much more narrow than this. For one thing, there are two main
1For further discussion of this distinction, see Mele (2001, 144–6). As Mele notes, ‘inward-
directed’ autonomy is also elsewhere described as ‘psychological autonomy’ (2001, 138).
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2ways of thinking about structure of the property that inward-directed autonomy
picks out. Here we can distinguish between autonomy as (i) a global property of
persons, taken as a whole, and as (ii) a property of particular attitudes of a per-
son, such as beliefs and desires. My interest will be the latter—viz., in attitudinal
autonomy.2
Discussions of attitudinal autonomy are almost entirely restricted to the lit-
erature on moral responsibility.3 In such debates, the central focus has been how
to spell out the kind of attitudinal autonomy that matters for the purposes of
moral, rather than epistemic, evaluations. I suggest that there is also an interest-
ing kind of attitudinal autonomy—what I’m calling epistemic attitudinal autonomy
(hereafter: epistemic autonomy)—that matters for knowledge.
Here is the plan for what follows. §2 articulates a case for thinking that (i)
there is a distinctive kind of epistemic autonomy, autonomy of belief, that matters
for propositional knowledge (§2.1); and (ii) that this kind of attitudinal autonomy
is importantly different from the kind that matters for moral responsibility (§2.2).
§3 shows what an internalist account of epistemic autonomy would look like and
argues that any such account faces intractable problems. §4 considers two broad
ways to be an externalist about epistemic autonomy: counterfactual externalism
and history-sensitive externalism. The former is shown to have its own problems,
whereas a version of the latter offers much more promise.4
2.1 Let’s take as a starting pointKeith Lehrer’s (1990) classic case ofMr.Truetemp:
TRUETEMP: Suppose a person, whomwe shall nameMr.Truetemp,
undergoes brain surgery by an experimental surgeon who invents a
small device which is both a very accurate thermometer and a com-
putational device capable of generating thoughts. The device, call it
a tempucomp, is implanted in Truetemp’s head so that the very tip
of the device, no larger than the head of pin, sits unnoticed on his
scalp and acts as a sensor to transmit information about the temper-
ature to the computational system in his brain. This device, in turn,
2For the present purposes, I’ll remain neutral about what the relationship is between attitudinal
autonomy and global autonomy, viz., the kind of autonomy that applies to a person as a whole. One
natural way of thinking about this relationship is as follows: one’s global autonomy is a matter of
one’s attitudinal autonomy. So, one is autonomous as a person just in case one’s relevant attitudes
are autonomous attitudes. See, however, Young (1980) for criticism of this picture.
3For some representative discussions, see Mele (2001, 2003); Fischer (2011); Fischer and Rav-
izza (2000); Weimer (2009); Cyr (2019); Cuypers (2006); and Levy (2011).
4For a more detailed treatment of the case for history-sensitive externalism about epistemic
autonomy, see Carter (2020, Ch. 2).
3sends a message to his brain causing him to think of the temperature
recorded by the external sensor. Assume that the tempucomp is very
reliable, and so his thoughts are correct temperature thoughts. All
told, this is a reliable belief-forming process. Now imagine, finally,
that he has no idea that the tempucomp has been inserted in his brain,
is only slightly puzzled about why he thinks so obsessively about the
temperature, but never checks a thermometer to determine whether
these thoughts about the temperature are correct. He accepts them
unreflectively, another effect of the tempucomp. Thus, he thinks and
accepts that the temperature is 104 degrees. It is. Does he know that
it is? (1990, 162–3)
The predominant view in mainstream epistemology is that Mr. Truetemp
does not know that the temperature is 104 degrees in the above case, despite the
reliability5 of his belief-forming process.6 There’s little consensus, though, as to
why.7 Lehrer himself, along with William Alston (1988), both reason along the
following lines: Truetemp lacks knowledge of the relevant temperature belief be-
cause (i) knowledge requires epistemic justification; and (ii) there is at least some
additional justified belief that Truetemp lacks but which he’d need in order to be
epistemically justified in believing that it is 104 degrees. For Lehrer, that ‘extra’
belief is a ‘metabelief’ about the reliability of the temperature-implant based pro-
cess; for Alston, the extra belief just needs to be a belief that could serve as a good
reason for believing that it’s 104 degrees (a reason Truetemp presently lacks). If
Truetemp had those beliefs, and appropriately based his temperature belief on
them, then he’d be a knower.
While something like this might look plausible as a diagnosis of Lehrer’s orig-
inal version of the case, it’s not hard to think up variations on the case where nei-
5Although the reliability of the process is, arguably, built in to the description of the case—
and as such is not a point of dispute—one creative line of dissent is due to Jennifer Nagel (2016).
Nagel’s contention is that while the thermometer is reliable enough, it is a separate matter whether
Truetemp’s belief-forming process is reliable, and on this point, her assessment is that it is not, as it
involves a kind of unreflective endorsement that is generally unreliable. For a critique of Nagel’s
reading of the case, see Goldman (2016). Note that the matter of whether Nagel’s line would work
on variations of Lehrer’s case remains open (e.g., where the details of the implantation are varied)
even if it were granted that her ‘unreliability’ diagnosis is a correct assessment of the original case.
6See however, Beebe (2004) for a dissenting view here.
7It’s worth noting that Lehrer’s case is often discussed together with Bonjour’s (1980) case of
Norman the Clairvoyant. These cases are, as Sosa (1991) calls them, ‘metaincoherence’ cases, in
that they both involve a lack of coherence between the source of the reliability of the process and
the subject’s own view of this source. Despite this commonality between the cases, there are also
epistemic asymmetries which make the TrueTemp case comparatively more useful in the context
of discussing epistemic autonomy.
4ther the Lehrer nor Alston lines would work. For example, suppose we run a twist
on the case that holds everything fixed except the following: what the scientists
implant ismore sophisticated than the tempucomp: call it the ‘TempucompDeluxe’.
The TempucompDeluxe not only compels8 Truetemp to believe the target propo-
sition (i.e., that it’s 104 degrees), but it also compels him to believe a further
proposition ‘X’, where we can fill in ‘X’ with either a Lehrer-style metabelief
or an Alston-style reason. Then—through a powerful form of hypnotism—the
TempucompDeluxe closes the circle by causing Truetemp to base his belief on the
relevant reason.9
On a Lehrer- or Alston-style diagnosis, it looks as though Mr. Truetemp is
now in the clear, knowledge-wise. And yet, he’s surely not. Here’s why he’s not: if
there is something epistemically objectionable (in the sense of being knowledge-
incompatible) about Mr. Truetemp original’s belief, there should, by parity of
reasoning, be something epistemically objectionable about the new beliefs which
he’s acquired in just the same way (e.g., compulsion by the implanted mecha-
nism). In short, if one doesn’t know the temperature on the basis of a gadget-
compelled belief, then neither does one know the temperature on the basis of
a gadget-compelled belief one is compelled to support on the basis of equally
gadget-compelled beliefs.
An entirely different story for why Mr. TrueTemp fails to know—one that
looks initially as though it might fare better in the TempucompDeluxe version
of the case—is due to John Greco (2010) and Duncan Pritchard (2010, 2012).
The Greco-Pritchard diagnosis of the original Truetemp goes as follows: (i)
knowledge must derive from cognitive ability in the sense that the correctness of
a known true belief must be because of the manifestation of a cognitive ability10;
(ii) Truetemp’s true belief derives from a reliable process but not from any cog-
nitive ability of his; (iii) Therefore, Truetemp doesn’t know. The rationale for
(ii) is, in short, that knowledge generating cognitive abilities must be appropri-
ately integrated into a thinker’s wider cognitive architecture. What constitutes the
8We are continuing to hold fixed the the compelled belief results from the sophisticated causal
mechanism Lehrer describes.
9Suppose this is either a causal basis or a doxastic basis—or a combination of both—depending
on what kind of account of the epistemic basing relation one favours. For discussion, see Korcz
(2019) and Carter and Bondy (2019).
10Note that Greco and Pritchard disagree about the extent to which the correctness of a true
belief must be creditable to ability in order for one to know. Greco’s line is that it must be primarily
creditable to cognitive ability. Pritchard, along with Lackey (2007), take this to be too strong given
that the condition seems not to be satisfied in cases of testimonial knowledge acquisition in friendly
epistemic environments. Pritchard’s preferred formulation is accordingly weaker than Greco’s; for
Pritchard the correctness of a known belief must be at least significantly creditable to cognitive
ability, even if not primarily creditable. For discussion, see Pritchard (2012).
5right kind of cognitive integration is a complicated issue.11 But here’s one notable
idea, due to Greco: integrated dispositions are at least sensitive to the operation
of other belief-forming dispositions. The disposition Truetemp has to form tem-
perature beliefs, however, is plausibly not sensitive to other dispositions he has
for forming beliefs (2010, 150–2). It’s just controlled entirely by the mechanism.
It looks, prima facie, like the Pritchard-Greco line might work not just as a
diagnosis for why Truetemp lacks knowledge, but also as one that carries over
to TempucompDeluxe. After all, in that case, when Truetemp believes correctly,
it doesn’t seem to be down to any properly integrated cognitive ability that he
has, and this is so even if (as is stipulated on that version of the case) he has some
additional beliefs that stand in support of the target proposition.
But notice that we can just pull the same trick again! Just imagine a fur-
ther twist on the case, where Truetemp has installed an even more impressive
device—viz., a ‘TempucompSUPER-Deluxe’—one that significantly rewires his cog-
nitive architecture in such a way that he now is compelled not only to believe
truly what the temperature is (104 degrees) on the basis of a reliable disposition,
but also—thanks to the TempucompSUPER-Deluxe—that reliable disposition has
been ‘auto-integrated’ by the device. In this version of the case, we can think of
Truetemp now having an ability, albeit, one that he is being compelled by the
device to exercise in such a way as to end up with the belief he does.
It’s not hard to see a general pattern emerging here. When a thinker is caused
to believe a proposition (even if reliably) in a manner such that the acquisition
of the belief ‘bypasses’ the thinker’s own exercise of her cognitive faculties (as it
does in all variations of the TrueTemp case considered), then two things seem to
follow. First, (i) the intuition that that the thinker lacks knowledge, viz., as in
the original Truetemp case, carries over; and second, (ii) that a viable explanation
for why this knowledge fails to be present can’t simply point to some epistemic
(roughly: truth-linked) condition on knowledge which is said not to be satisfied.
A different kind of explanation is needed. At least, this seems to be the lesson from
the foregoing discussion.12
Let’s now take a step back. At this juncture, there are broadly three paths
available:
11For some representative discussions, seeCarter andKallestrup (2019); Palermos (2011, 2014);
Menary (2007); Andrada (2019); Clark (2015); Carter and Kallestrup (2017); and Carter and Paler-
mos (2015b, 2015a).
12The reason for (ii) is that, plausibly, for any proposed epistemic condition we might appeal
to in an attempt to explain why the no-knowledge intuition in (i) holds, we can simply imagine a
variation of that case where the following conjunction applies: that proposed epistemic condition is
satisfied and it’s the case that the acquisition of the target belief bypasses the thinker’s own exercise
of her cognitive faculties.
6• Option 1: (a) Grant that one lacks knowledge when the acquisition of the
target belief bypasses the thinker’s own exercise of her cognitive faculties;
(b) Insist that there is some plausible epistemic condition (e.g., some kind
of epistemic justification condition) on knowledge that can’t possibly by satis-
fied by further and even fancier iterations of the ‘TempucompSUPER-Deluxe.’13
• Option 2: Bite the bullet and deny that one lacks knowledge when the ac-
quisition of the target belief bypasses the thinker’s own exercise of her cog-
nitive faculties (e.g., as in the original Truetemp case).
• Option 3: (a) Grant that one lacks knowledge when the acquisition of the
target belief bypasses the thinker’s own exercise of her cognitive faculties;
but (b) deny that there is some plausible epistemic condition (e.g., some kind
of epistemic justification condition) on knowledge that can’t possibly by satis-
fied by further and even fancier iterations of the ‘TempucompSUPER-Deluxe’.
The prevailing literature has generally gone, de facto, for Option 1 or, in rare
cases, Option 2.14 But what the pattern we’ve seen in this section suggests is that
Option 3—which thus far has remained unexplored—might be themost plausible
avenue for those who don’t want to bite the bullet and maintain that Truetemp
knows.
But if Option 3 is right way to go, then an interesting implication follows
for the theory of knowledge: it looks like knowledge requires not just epistemi-
cally justified belief, but (in some sense to be articulated) epistemically autonomous
belief, where the the relevant kind of ‘epistemic autonomy’ must be such that,
with reference to it, we could explain why ‘TempucompSUPER-Deluxe’-style cases
in principle are not cases of knowledge.
I’m going to assume from here on out that Option 3 is worth exploring.15
And so the question driving the rest of the chapter will be:
13Also in logical space is the idea that when the acquisition of the target belief bypasses the
thinker’s own exercise of her cognitive faculties, she thereby acquires a defeater for that belief,
and this explains why she lacks knowledge. Such a defeater would best be understood not as a
psychological or mental state defeater (given that the there is no such defeater ex hypothesi), but as
a normative defeater. A normative defeat diagnosis would seem to occupy a mixed space between
Option 1 and Option 3. I am setting aside this option for consideration here because there is no
straightforward way to articulate this diagnosis in terms of a proposition Truetemp both ought
to believe and is such that it would count against the target proposition. However, for a more
complete story on how defeaters interface with an epistemic autonomy condition on knowledge,
see Carter (2020 Ch. 3).
14See Beebe (2004). For an alternative diagnosis that does not fall neatly into any of these
categories, see Kaplan (2018), whose position is that the matter of whether Truetemp knows lacks
any methodological import, and that the theorist should simply remain agnostic on the point.
15For a detailed defence of pursuing this strategy, see Carter (2020 Ch. 1).
7Guiding Question: In what sense, exactly, does propositional
knowledge require epistemically autonomous belief? Put an-
other way: what should an epistemic autonomy condition on
propositional-knowledge-apt belief look like?
2.2. Themost interesting fault line for answering the above question is—aswe’ll
shortly see—one between internalist and externalist approaches to the epistemic
autonomy of beliefs. But before digging in to this issue, it’s worth briefly address-
ing the following question: “Won’t an account of the kind of attitudinal autonomy
that matters for moral responsibility also work just fine as an account of the kind
of attitudinal autonomy (of beliefs specifically) that matters for knowledge?”
The answer to this question is ‘no’. A quick and easy way to see why these
issues come apart will be to focus on how they clearly do so in cases of self-
arrangement—viz., where one’s lack of attitudinal autonomy at a later time is in-
tentionally pre-arranged by one at a previous time.
Consider two versions of an incapacitated driving case:
• Version 1: Someone forces you to ingest a potent cocktail of hallucinogenic
drugs, puts you behind the wheel of a moving vehicle, and then—driving
this vehicle under the influence of the drugs—you cause a wreck.
• Version 2: Everything is the same except you chose to take the hallucinogenic
drugs.
The prevailing thinking in the moral responsibility literature is that while
your attitudes (e.g., beliefs, desires, perceptions, emotions) lack the kind of at-
titudinal autonomy that matters for moral responsibility in Version 1, this isn’t
the case in Version 2. And this is so even though your attitudes are equally at
the mercy of the strong drugs in both cases when you cause the wreck. What is
said to make the difference is self-arrangement;16 in Version 2, you (unimpeded
by any drugs) chose to take the drugs that would later have the effects on you
that they did. So these attitudes, no matter the effect the drugs have on them,
remain autonomous in the sense that matters for moral responsibility later on (e.g.,
when you’re behind the wheel) because these effects are self-arranged.
So does self-arrangement make a difference when it comes to whether a be-
lief is autonomous in the way that matters for knowledge, as it does when what’s
at issue is the kind of attitudinal autonomy that matters for moral responsibility?
To get a clearer grip on this, let’s compare self-arrangement versions of the drunk
16See, for discussion, Mele (2001, 176), Fischer and Ravizza (2000, 50), and Carter (2018).
8driving case we’ve already considered (Version 1 and Version 2) with the origi-
nal (non-self-arrangement) and self-arrangement variations on our three tempu-
comp cases.
No self-arrangement Self-arrangement
Drunk Driving No Moral Responsibility (V1) Moral Responsibility (V2)
Tempucomp No Knowledge ?
TempucompDeluxe No Knowledge ?
TempucompSUPER-Deluxe No Knowledge ?
If self-arrangement really made a difference with respect to whether a be-
lief is autonomous in the way that matters for knowledge in a way that is analo-
gous to the difference it in makes (vis-à-vis attitudinal autonomy) in the case of
moral responsibility, then we should expect that—in self-arrangement versions
of our tempucomp cases—there would be, by parity of reasoning, no epistemic-
autonomy related reason for withholding knowledge (just as there is no autonomy
related reason for withholding moral responsibility).
But this is the wrong result. The import of self-arrangement—once we shift
focus from moral responsibility to knowledge—turns out to be clearly disanalo-
gous. Just consider: while the matter of whether you took the drugs or had them
forced upon you obviously bears on whether you are morally responsible later for
being in whatever state you’re in (e.g., incapacitated and thus dangerous behind
the wheel), it’s not at all evident that our verdict on Truetemp, qua candidate
knower, should change in the slightest if we added to the Truetemp backstory
that Truetemp willingly at some point in the past paid a superscientist to experi-
ment on him. The addition of this kind of historical fact seems entirely irrelevant
to whether he counts as knowing, at a later time, when affected as he is by what
the scientist does to him.17
Summing up, then: (i) propositional knowledge requires not just epistemi-
cally justified belief, but epistemically autonomous belief (conclusion of §2.1); and (ii)
the kind of attitudinal autonomy (viz., of beliefs) that matters for knowledge is
different from the kind of attitudinal autonomy that matters for moral respon-
sibility (conclusion of §2.2)—which means that to get an account of it in view, we
17This is not to say that it would be irrelevant to whether Truetemp knows if in addition to
self-arranging the procedure (e.g., by paying a superscientist), Truetemp also came to know the
ins and outs of how the device works. (For related discussion on this point, see Carter 2018, 2020,
Ch. 2). Rather, the idea here is just that the relevance of the fact of prior self-arrangement is clear
when what’s at issue is moral responsibility, and not when what’s at issue is whether one possesses
knowledge.
9need to look beyond the kinds of accounts already available in the literature on
moral responsibility.
3. What is the nature of the kind of epistemic autonomy a belief must have in
order to qualify as knowledge? Here’s one potential answer:
Internalism about epistemic autonomy (IEA): The knowledge-
relevant (viz., epistemic) autonomy of a belief at a time, T, is deter-
mined entirely by the subject’s present mental structure at T.
If IEA is true, then (in slogan form) psychological twins at a time do not differ
in the epistemic autonomy of their beliefs at that time.18
In the literature on internalism about epistemic justification, psychological
twins cases are often used in the service of supporting an internalist view of epis-
temic justification—viz., one on which psychological twins at a time do not differ
with respect to the epistemic justification they have for their beliefs at that time.
This idea is, at any rate, at the heart of the New Evil Demon thought experiment
against epistemic externalism.19
It would be natural to expect that, if drawing our attention to psychological
twins cases is a move that is supposed to lend intuitive support for internalism
about epistemic justification, then so it would as well for internalism about epis-
temic auotnomy. However, the opposite seems to be true.
Consider the following case, which is an epistemic twist on a case used by
Mele (2001, 145) to argue against internalism about attitudinal autonomy.
PSYCHOLOGICALTWINS: Ann andBeth are psychological twins.
They are identically mentally constituted. Both believe that Cicero’s
scribe was named Tiro. Ann believes this because she read it in a
book. Beth believes it because scientists want her to be psychologi-
cally identical to Ann, and so they brainwash her until her psychology
– as it pertains to all matters of Roman history – matches Ann’s ex-
actly.
If IEA is true, then Ann—who is a paradigmatic knower—satisfies an au-
tonomous belief condition on knowledge if and only if Beth does. But Beth looks
18Examples of internalism about epistemic autonomy would be (epistemic variations on) in-
ternalist views of attitudinal autonomy, such as those defended by Frankfurt (1988) and Dworkin
(1981).
19See, e.g., Cohen (1984) and Lehrer and Cohen (1983) for presentations of the problem, and
Littlejohn (2009) for an overview.
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sure to fail any plausible construal of an autonomous belief condition on knowl-
edge; she is effectively brainwashed. Beth is, at best, a Truetemp.
There are two important take-away points here. First, internalism about epis-
temic autonomy is false.20 But, secondly, it’s worth emphasising that this verdict
is is neither implied by, nor implies, a denial of internalism about epistemic justi-
fication. After all, it’s possible for all that’s been said that Beth and Ann are equally
epistemically justified in believing that Cicero’s scribe is Tiro (in virtue of their
matching psychology post-brainwashing) even while they differ with respect to
the kind of epistemic autonomy that matters for knowing.21
4. On the assumption here on out that internalism about epistemic autonomy
is a non-starter, the focus will now be squarely on epistemic autonomy and ex-
ternalism. According to externalism about epistemic autonomy:
Externalism about epistemic autonomy (EEA): It’s not the case
that the knowledge-relevant (viz., epistemic) autonomy of a belief
at a time, T, is determined entirely by the subject’s present mental
structure at T.
EEA is a minimal conception of externalism about epistemic autonomy in
that it consists merely in the denial of IEA. (Compare: a minimal conception of
externalism about epistemic justification consists just in a denial of internalism
about epistemic justification.22)
20At least, (IEA), which is a ‘time-slice’ thesis is false. There could potentially be other ways of
carving up the internalism/externalism divide, vis-à-vis epistemic autonomy, such that PSYCHO-
LOGICAL TWINS would not count against all internalist views, even if it counts against (IEA).
See, for example, the discussion later in this paper of ‘counterfactual externalism’, which could (on
some possible ways of carving up the landscape) qualify as an internalist view.
21Additionally, a denial of internalism about epistemic autonomy is compatible (given the con-
clusions from §2.2) with various ways of thinking about the kind of attitudinal autonomy that
matters for moral repsonsibility. Given that these have been shown to be fundamentally different
issues, it is at least possible to be, for example, an externalist about the kind of attitudinal autonomy
that matters for knowledge while being an internalist about the kind of attitudinal autonomy that
matters for moral responsibility. That said—and it is beyond the scope of what I can do to argue
for this here—it’s worth noting that Mele’s original version of the PSYCHOLOGICAL TWINS
case is (e.g., 2001, 145), independently, militates against going for an internalist view about atti-
tudinal autonomy relevant to moral responsibility. For related discussion, see Weimer (2009) and
Carter and Pritchard (2020 Ch. 2).
22Of course, just as there are different versions of internalism about epistemic justification (e.g.,
accessibilism vs. mentalism), you can have distinct minimal conceptions of epistemic externalism
that consist in denials of different formulations of epistemic internalism. For discussion, see Carter
et al. (2014).
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Substantive externalist theses in epistemology involve not only a denial of
internalism, but also a positive thesis about what it is in virtue of which something
possesses positive epistemic status when it does. For example: process reliabilists
about epistemic justification (e.g., Goldman 1979, 1999) submit—in addition to
simply denying internalism—that what makes a belief epistemically justified is
the reliability of the process that issues the belief.
This section will consider two substantive forms of externalism about epis-
temic autonomy: counterfactual externalism (§4.1) and history-sensitive externalism
(§4.2).
4.1. One way to be a substantive externalist about the kind of attitudinal auton-
omy that matters for moral responsibility is to take a ‘counterfactual’ approach of
the sort that has been defended in various places by John Christman (e.g., 1991,
2007). According to Christman, the question of whether a given belief, P, is au-
tonomous in the way that matters for moral responsibility is one we can settle by
asking how the subject, in the here and now, would respond to P, if she were to
critically reflect on P in light of (an accurate description of) its origins.
This is an externalist account becausewhatmakes the relevant belief autonomous
can be something external to the subject’s psychology. (After all, we might at any
given time be clueless as to how we would respond were we to critically reflect on
a given attitude; for the counterfactual externalist, all that matters is how, in fact,
we would respond under appropriate conditions of reflection.)
With a bit more precision, the proposal is as follows:
Counterfactual externalism about moral-responsibility relevant
attitudinal autonomy: Necessary and sufficient for an attitude’s au-
tonomy, at a time, t, is that (i) the agent is able to adequately reflect
on the attitude P at t; where (ii) ‘adequate reflection’ requires the
possession of a representation of an alternative to that attitude, Q,
one that would be necessary for the subject to realistically imagine
an alternative to P; and (iii) were the agent at t to adequately reflect
on P in light of a ‘minimally adequate account’ of P’s developmental
history, she would not be alienated from it.23
With reference to this kind of account, Christman diagnoses why, for in-
stance, certain traits one has would not be autonomous (in the sense relevant to
moral responsibility) even if one has never in fact repudiated them and indeed
even if one positively endorses them as their own. He gives the following case to
lend support to this idea:
23I borrow this succinct summation of Christman’s view fromWeimer (2009, 186).
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PIANO:We can imagine a personwho finds out she has been severely
abused in her childhood by someone who is responsible for several
of the proclivities and skills she has developed. In coming to grips
with the memories of the abuse, she has repudiated many of those
proclivities. But she doesn’t realize or remember that this person also
taught her to play the piano, which she still loves to do and does well.
If she were told that her piano-playing was also rooted in her time
with this abuser, she would feel alienated from that part of herself
also; but in her ignorance she plays on contentedly. Does this person
count as autonomous? On my view she does not, since, were she to
reflect on the trait in light of its origins she would be alienated from
it (2007, 22–23).
There are some well-known worries for this kind of proposal—to both the
necessity and sufficiency of satisfying the counterfactual condition.24 These ob-
jections won’t concern us here.
Rather, what will be of interest is what an ‘epistemic twist’ on a Christman-
style counterfactual externalismmight look like, andwhether it could offer a plau-
sible account of epistemic autonomy (regardless of whether it is viable or not as
an account of the kind of attitudinal autonomy relevant to moral responsibility.)
With this in mind, consider the following variation on the view:
Counterfactual externalism about epistemic autonomy: Neces-
sary and sufficient for a belief’s epistemic autonomy, at a time, t, is
that (i) the agent is able to adequately reflect on the belief P at t;
where (ii) ‘adequate reflection’ requires the possession of a represen-
tation of an alternative to that attitude, Q, one that would be nec-
essary for the subject to realistically imagine an alternative to P; and
(iii) were the agent at t to adequately reflect on P in light of a ‘mini-
mally adequate account’ of P’s developmental history, she would not
be alienated from it.
For a case (broadly analogous to the PIANO case) that might intuitively mo-
tivate this kind of view, condider the following case of ‘therapy Truetemp’:
THERAPY TRUETEMP: Suppose that Mr. Truetemp25 is taken
to a therapist, to help him make sense of why he thinks so often,
24See Weimer (2009), and particularly, his discussion of the case of Dora and Cara (Weimer
2009, 190).
25Mr. Truetemp from the original case—suppose—though any of the versions from §2.1 will
do.
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seemingly inexplicably, about the temperature. Through this ther-
apy, Truetemp uncovers suppressedmemories of the operation. After
some further digging, he comes to believe that many (but not all) of
his temperature beliefs are the result of this operation and, as a result,
feels alienated from them—such that he desires to give these beliefs
up. But, unbeknownst to him, the belief he has presently that it’s 104
is among those sourced in the operation; since he’s unaware of this,
he does not in fact feel alienated in any way from this belief.
Counterfactual externalism about epistemic autonomy generates the prima
facie intuitive result here that, in THERAPY TRUETEMP, the mere fact that
Mr. Truetemp doesn’t actually appreciate the origin of the target belief (that it is
104 degrees) and repudiate it on that basis should count for naught if in fact he
would have done so were he to have reflected on it while appreciating its origins.
Nonetheless, counterfactual externalism about epistemic autonomy both dou-
bly misses the mark—satisfying this kind of counterfactual condition is neither
necessary nor sufficient for epistemic autonomy.
Let’s consider the sufficiency leg of the view first. Suppose Truetemp reflects
on a belief of his about the temperature (e.g., that it was 84 degrees yesterday
at noon) which was in fact not the result of the Tempucomp at all, but instead a
result of trusting an expert meteorologist. Now, suppose Truetemp—because he
was treated badly by a meterologist as a child and has discovered the meterologist
to be the source of his belief—feels alienated from it. Counterfactual externalism
about epistemic autonomy generates the implausible result that Truetemp’s belief
that it was 84 degrees yesterday at noon lacks the kind of autonomy that matters
for knowledge.
The necessity leg of the view also runs into problems. Firstly, the view gen-
erates the wrong result in the case of mathematical knowledge. All mathemat-
ical knowledge (as well as logical knowledge) looks like it’s going to be ruled as
not epistemically autonomous with reference to counterfactual externalism sim-
ply because it will fail the ‘adequate reflection’ clause, and regardless of the way
one came to possess that knowledge in the first place. In paradigmatic cases of
mathematical knowledge, we will not be in a position to ‘realistically imagine an
alternative’ to the known belief given the necessity of mathematical truths.26 And
what goes for mathematical truths plausibly also goes for analytic truths. (When
reflecting on your belief that bachelors are unmarried, can you ‘realistically imag-
ine’ an alternative?)
26For a recent discussion of the relationship between mathematics as a subject matter and nec-
essary truths, see Yli-Vakkuri and Hawthorne (2018).
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A second problem for the necessity leg of counterfactual externalism about
epistemic autonomy concerns the alienation condition that is central to it. Sup-
pose Truetemp is a transhumanist—deeply influenced by the thinking of Ray
Kurzweil27. Truetemp, having discovered the origins of his Tempucomp-generated
belief that is 104 degrees, does not feel alienated from it in any way, owing to his
philosophical view that he is (in the words of Andy Clark 2003) a ‘natural born
cyborg’. It’s implausible that whether Truetemp’s belief that it’s 104 degrees has
the kind of autonomy that matters for whether he knows that it’s 104 degrees de-
pends in any way whatsoever on whether he aligns himself philosophically with
Kurzweil’s and Clark’s transhumanist thinking or, instead, rejects transhumanism
for bioconservativism.28
4.2. Here’s a summary of where we’ve got to:
(a) Propositional knowledge requires not just epistemically justified belief, but
epistemically autonomous belief (conclusion of §2.1).29
(b) The kind of attitudinal autonomy (viz., of beliefs) that matters for knowl-
edge is different from the kind of attitudinal autonomy that matters for
moral responsibility (conclusion of §2.2).
(c) We should reject internalism about knowledge-relevant (i.e., epistemic) au-
tonomy, the view that the epistemic autonomy of a belief at a time, T, is
determined entirely by the subject’s present mental structure at T. (conclu-
sion from §3).
(d) Counterfactual externalism is implausible as a substantive form of externalism
about epistemic autonomy (conclusion from §4.1).
In this section, we’ll look at a substantive form of externalism about epistemic
autonomy that has real promise.
The view I want to now defend takes as a starting point two conditions that
form the backbone of Mele’s (2001) history-sensitive externalism about the kind
of attitudinal autonomy that matters for moral responsibility. These two key
conditions are:
27See, e.g., Kurzweil (2005).
28For some representative statements of bioconservativism, which takes a normative stance
against embracing any sort of cyborg-style future for humanity, see Sandel (2009) and Kass (2004).
29A separate question, of course, is whether and to what extent epistemic justification requires
epistemically autonomous belief. It’s beyond the scope of what I can do here to take this up in
detail. However, there is good reason to think that epistemically justified belief—and not merely
knowledge—also requires epistemically autonomous belief.
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• a bypass condition—viz., a condition pertaining to whether the attitude
in question was acquired in a way that ‘bypassed’ the subject’s cognitive
faculties.
• an unsheddability condition—viz., a condition pertaining to whether the
subject is able to give up, or at least attenuate the strength of, the relevant
attitude.
According to Mele, an attitude is autonomous in the way that matters for
moral responsibility only if it has a certain kind of history (and, regardless of
whether one is aware of that history). In particular, the attitude has to have a
history that is free from compulsion. And an an attitude has a compulsion-free
history only if it’s not the case that the acquisition of the attitude satisfies both the
bypass and unsheddability conditions, spelled out in a particular way.
I will set aside entirely whetherMele’s history-sensitive externalism is a viable
account of attitudinal autonomy relevant to moral responsibility. Rather, what I
want to show is that versions of these two key conditions can be used to frame a
very plausible externalist account of epistemic autonomy.
With this in mind, let’s get a simple version of the view on the table.
History-sensitive externalism about epistemic autonomy (HSEEA):
S’s belief that p is epistemically autonomous (viz., autonomous way
that is necessary for propositional knowledge) at a time, t, if and only
if p has a compulsion-free history at t; and this is a history it has if
and only if it’s not the case that S came to acquire her belief that p in
a way that: (i) bypasses S’s cognitive faculties, and (ii) the bypassing
of such faculties issues in S’s being unable to shed P.
HSEEA looks strong from the start. For one thing, it looks, at least prima
facie, as though it deals nicely with a range of cases we’ve considered so far. Be-
ginning with PSYCHOLOGICAL TWINS: whereas internalism can’t explain
why Ann’s belief is epistemically autonomous but Beth’s is not, HSEEA has a
simple answer: Beth’s belief has a compulsion history and Ann’s doesn’t.
Likewise, HSEEA is not threatened by the kinds of cases that made trouble
for the necessity and sufficiency legs of counterfactual externalism, and this is
because the matter of how one would reflect on a given belief one has acquired is
irrelevant to epistemic autonomy onHSEEA.Granted, the counterfactual condi-
tion of counterfactual externalism looked initially like it would be essential to get
the right result in cases like THERAPY TRUETEMP, the epistemic analogue
to Christman’s PIANO case. However, HSEEA gets the right result in that case
as well. It follows from HSEEA that Therapy Truetemp’s belief that it’s 104 de-
grees is not epistemically autonomous. This is not, on HSEEA, because he would
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have repudiated it had he reflected on it in light of an accurate description of its
origins. Rather, it’s because that belief has a compulsion history, with reference
to the bypass and unsheddability clauses of HSEEA.
And even more, notice that HSEEA looks well-suited to deal not only with
the original Truetemp case, but also with the kinds of ‘epistemically improved’
variations on the case we considered in §2.1 which were used to motivate an epis-
temic autonomy condition on propositional knowledge in the first place. What
these cases exploited after all was the fact that (in imagined scenarios) the epis-
temic justification-related credentials of a belief could be attained in ways that
bypass the subject’s exercise of any of her cognitive faculties. A bypass condition
of the sort that features in HSEEA is exactly the kind of condition that can rule
out these cases in principle as cases where knowledge is present.
Question: given the work a bypass condition is able to do, isn’t the addition
of an unsheddability condition theoretically superfluous?
The answer is that it’s not superfluous. To see why, consider a further twist
on the Truetemp case, one where sheddability is present.
TRUETEMP-SHEDDABLE: In the original version of the case, it’s
not said explicitly, but it is implied, that Mr. TrueTemp can’t easily
shed this belief (by eradicating it or attenuating its strength). He’s at
any rate stuck with it. Let’s now suppose that, on the present variation
of the case, this is explicitly not so. Mr. TrueTemp can easily shed the
belief, by simply judging the content to be false (e.g., in light of other
things he believes) or otherwise attenuating its strength. Finally, let’s
suppose he elects not to revise this belief in any way, despite having
the power to, after subjecting it to (non-compelled) rational scrutiny,
including scrutiny by which he comes to find out that the mechanism
he’s using is a reliable one.
It’s not at all evident that Truetemp doesn’t know that it’s 104 degrees in
TRUETEMP SHEDDABLE, even though the history of the belief includes the
fact that it was acquired in a way that clearly bypassed Truetemp’s cognitive facul-
ties. In Truetemp sheddable (unlike in the original case, presumably) the power
to revise or give up the belief is entirely Truetemp’s, and the fact that he has not
revised this particular belief (given the new evidence he has) has nothing what-
soever to do with the workings of the tempucomp.
The situation would be different if, unlike in TRUETEMP SHEDDABLE,
we make explicit that whatever beliefs are caused by the tempucomp are unrevis-
able in any way, such that even if Truetemp acquired new evidence against such
beliefs, this evidence would have no sway for him.
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In light of the above, the initial presentation of HSEEA will include an un-
sheddability condition along with a bypass condition.
That said—unfortunately—HSEEA can not quite stand up to scrutiny with-
out further refinements. In what follows, I want to describe three problems for
HSEEA. None requires that we abandon the core HSEEA-style view, but these
three problems require three distinct improvements on HSEEA.
The first problem is a kind of preemption problem which goes as follows: you
can’t ‘bypass’ a cognitive faculty that isn’t there to bypass. However, presumably,
if a tempucomp was installed in infancy prior to the development of any cogni-
tive faculties, then provided a tempucomp-issued belief caused at such a point
was unsheddable, it looks like it should fail an epistemic autonomy condition on
knowledge no less than in a case where the cognitive faculties of a thinker were
first developed and then bypassed by the tempucomp.
Fortunately, there is an easy fix here, which will be to tweak the bypass com-
ponent so that it is a disjunctive condition that includes either bypassing or pre-
empting cognitive faculties. Let’s say that the subject comes to possess a belief
in a way that preempts one’s cognitive faculties if and only if the process that is-
sues the belief lacks the opportunity (trivially) to bypass the subject’s cognitive
faculties. The resulting tweaked version of HSEEA is as follows:
History-sensitive externalism about epistemic autonomy (HSEEA)*:
S’s belief that p is epistemically autonomous (viz., autonomous way
that is necessary for propositional knowledge) at a time, t, if and only
if p has a compulsion-free history at t; and this is a history it has if
and only if it’s not the case that S came to acquire her belief that p
in a way that: (i) bypasses or preempts S’s cognitive faculties, and
(ii) the bypassing or preemption of such faculties issues in S’s being
unable to shed P.
In short, HSEEA* can deal with ‘infant hardwiring’ cases whereas the original
HSEEA can not. So far so good.
But there remain more substantive challenges. The second that I want to
consider—the opportunity problem—concerns the ‘cognitive faculty’ dimension of
the bypass clause. To get a feel for this problem, let’s consider two possible vari-
ations on the Truetemp backstory:
• Variation 1: The neurosurgeons, prior to implementing the tempucomp,
are allowing Truetemp to play a role in the customisation of the device
prior to fitting—by giving Truetemp an option to prearrange exactly which
beliefs (at a later time) will be compelled by the device. Truetemp, however,
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is very drunk, and agrees (capable only of muddled thought) to each belief
the neurosurgeons propose that the temupcomp will later compel him to
endorse.
• Variation 2: The neurosurgeons, prior to implementing the tempucomp,
are allowing Truetemp to play a role in the customisation of the device
prior to fitting—by giving Truetemp an option to prearrange exactly which
beliefs (at a later time) will be compelled by the device. Truetemp is sober
and clear-headed; however—in a room with no books or computer—he is
deprived of any information on the basis of which to assess, for any given
belief the neurosurgeons propose the tempucomp will later compel him to
endorse, whether it would be reasonable to agree to have it later so com-
pelled. He accordingly makes each decision arbitrarily, by simply flipping
a coin.
Without further qualification, it looks as though the bypass clause is not satis-
fied in either Variation 1 or Variation 2. But if that’s right, then HSEEA* implies,
counterintuitively, that—whereas Truetemp in the original case lacks knowledge
because his belief is not epistemically autonomous—this is not the case if the back-
stories in either Variation 1 or Variation 2 are added.
Bizarrely, then, what HSEEA* appears to imply that your cognitive faculties
haven’t been ‘bypassed’ (in the way thatmatters for epistemic autonomy of a given
belief) so long they were in any manner whatsoever exercised in a way that made a
difference to the acquisition of the target belief. A more plausible picture would
hold that Truetemp—even though he trivially exercised his faculties (while in
poor shape, and poorly situated)—in the course of acquiring the target belief(s),
his doing so made no difference with respect to the epistemic autonomy of those
beliefs. Put another way, a better formulation of the bypass clause in HSEEA*
will allow us to say that Truetemp is in effectively the same position, vis-à-vis the
epistemic autonomy of the beliefs he acquires in Variations 1 and 2, as he is in
the original case.
A strategy for a fix, which will get Variations 1 and 2 right, is to incorporate
the following idea: to replace the generic ‘cognitive faculties’ with ‘cognitive com-
petences’, where—and following a well-known idea in epistemology due to Ernest
Sosa (2007, 2015)—a cognitive or epistemic competence is not merely a disposi-
tion to reliably attain epistemic ends (e.g., true beliefs), but a disposition to do so
when (i) in proper shape; and (ii) properly situated.30 By way of analogy: it doesn’t
30Sosa articulates the three components of a competence as involving a ‘seat, shape, and sit-
uation’ component—viz., a ‘triple S’ structure. A complete competence incorporates all three ele-
ments. For example, you exercise your complete competence to drive a car only if you actually are
awake and alert (proper shape) and on normal roads (proper situation). See, e.g., Sosa (2010).
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count against one’s competence to drive a car if one would drive off the road
when drugged or placed on abnormally slick roads. Likewise: it doesn’t count
against, e.g., your perceptual, reasoning and memory-related competences if, in
exercising them, you gain false beliefs when when mentally compromised (e.g.,
improper shape) or improperly situated (e.g., in a room with no possibility to
acquire the kind of evidence that would normally bear on whether to accept the
target proposition.)
Whereas the acquisition of the relevant beliefs acquired in Variations 1 and
2 above do not bypass Truetemp’s cognitive faculties, they do bypass his relevant
cognitive competences in these cases. Thus, what Variations 1 and 2 suggest is a
transition from HSEEA* to HSEEA**:
History-sensitive externalism about epistemic autonomy (HSEEA)**:
S’s belief that p is epistemically autonomous (viz., autonomous way
that is necessary for propositional knowledge) at a time, t, if and only
if p has a compulsion-free history at t; and this is a history it has if
and only if it’s not the case that S came to acquire her belief that p in
a way that: (i) bypasses or preempts S’s cognitive competences, and
(ii) the bypassing or preemption of such competences issues in S’s
being unable to shed P.31
While HSEEA** can handle all the cases we’ve discussed thus far, there re-
mains one further important area where the condition needs a refinement, and
which this section will conclude by discussing. We can call this third issue the
remote unsheddability problem.
The crux of the remote unsheddability problem is illustrated in cases like the
following. Stipulate that Truetemp’s acquisition of some belief, X, bypassed his
cognitive competences, as perHSEEA**. But now suppose Truetemp’s belief that
X is not, strictly speaking, unsheddable, simply because it is remotely possible that
it be shedded, even though it would not be shedded through any normal course
of competent inquiry.
Remote sheddability cases like the above reveal the need for an amendment
to the unsheddability clause in HSEAA** in order to avoid the unwanted result
that almost no belief, any any circumstance, will be unsheddable.
The natural fix here is to block an unrestricted modal reading of ‘unsheded-
ability’ by restricting the relevant class of worlds to nearby worlds—thus replac-
ing ‘unable to shed’ with unable to ‘easily enough’ shed, as follows:
31While this position might seem like an ‘internalist’ view on some ways of cutting up inter-
nalism/externalism about epistemic autonomy, it comes out externalist on my proposed dividing
lines in light of being at odds with (IEA). See fn. 22 for further discussion.
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History-sensitive externalism about epistemic autonomy (HSEEA)***:
S’s belief that p is epistemically autonomous (viz., autonomous way
that is necessary for propositional knowledge) at a time, t, if and only
if p has a compulsion-free history at t; and this is a history it has if
and only if it’s not the case that S came to acquire her belief that p in a
way that: (i) bypasses or preempts S’s cognitive competences, and (ii)
the bypassing or preemption of such competences issues in S’s being
unable to easily enough shed P.
HSEEA***, unlike HSEEA**, can make sense of the fact that—for example—
Truetemp’s belief couldn’t change from (i) lacking the kind of epistemic autonomy
that’s necessary for knowledge, to (ii) possessing that kind of autonomy, simply
were we to alter the belief’s sheddability profile such that there is a far-off world
(e.g., one where he is struck just right by a bolt of lightning, remapping his cog-
nitive architecture) in which the belief could be shed.
5. Let’s recap. Although a flat-footed history-sensitive externalist account of
epistemic autonomy—i.e., HSEAA—outperforms its internalist and counterfac-
tual externalist competitors, HSEAA nonetheless faced three distinct kinds of
problems discussed in §4.2: (i) the preemption problem, (ii) the opportunity problem,
and (iii) the remote unsheddability problem.
I’ve discussed these problems separately because each forces a different kind
of revision toHSEAA. The version we finished with, HSEEA***, reflects all three
revisions to the original HSEAA account, and so has the resources to handle all
three kinds of problems.
HSEAA*** might well benefit from further technical refinements, given that
the view cobbles together different working parts. The aim here is not to make
those further refinements, but rather, to have at least made enough of the key
refinements to illustrate what the view has the power to do in comparison with
internalist and externalist alternatives.32
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